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re Falk Lieder
Falk Lieder (Project leader)
Max Planck Research Group Leader
re Aashay Mehta
Aashay Mehta
Alumni
re Saksham Consul
Saksham Consul
Scientific Programmer
re Anirudha Kemtur
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Sanit Gupta
Alumni
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Peter Dayan
Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics
11 results

2019


How do people learn how to plan?
How do people learn how to plan?

Jain, Y. R., Gupta, S., Rakesh, V., Dayan, P., Callaway, F., Lieder, F.

Conference on Cognitive Computational Neuroscience, September 2019 (conference)

Abstract
How does the brain learn how to plan? We reverse-engineer people's underlying learning mechanisms by combining rational process models of cognitive plasticity with recently developed empirical methods that allow us to trace the temporal evolution of people's planning strategies. We find that our Learned Value of Computation model (LVOC) accurately captures people's average learning curve. However, there were also substantial individual differences in metacognitive learning that are best understood in terms of multiple different learning mechanisms-including strategy selection learning. Furthermore, we observed that LVOC could not fully capture people's ability to adaptively decide when to stop planning. We successfully extended the LVOC model to address these discrepancies. Our models broadly capture people's ability to improve their decision mechanisms and represent a significant step towards reverse-engineering how the brain learns increasingly effective cognitive strategies through its interaction with the environment.

How do people learn to plan? How do people learn to plan? Project Page [BibTex]

2019

How do people learn to plan? How do people learn to plan? Project Page [BibTex]

2018


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Learning to Select Computations

Callaway, F., Gul, S., Krueger, P. M., Griffiths, T. L., Lieder, F.

In Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence: Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Conference, August 2018, Frederick Callaway and Sayan Gul and Falk Lieder contributed equally to this publication. (inproceedings)

Abstract
The efficient use of limited computational resources is an essential ingredient of intelligence. Selecting computations optimally according to rational metareasoning would achieve this, but this is computationally intractable. Inspired by psychology and neuroscience, we propose the first concrete and domain-general learning algorithm for approximating the optimal selection of computations: Bayesian metalevel policy search (BMPS). We derive this general, sample-efficient search algorithm for a computation-selecting metalevel policy based on the insight that the value of information lies between the myopic value of information and the value of perfect information. We evaluate BMPS on three increasingly difficult metareasoning problems: when to terminate computation, how to allocate computation between competing options, and planning. Across all three domains, BMPS achieved near-optimal performance and compared favorably to previously proposed metareasoning heuristics. Finally, we demonstrate the practical utility of BMPS in an emergency management scenario, even accounting for the overhead of metareasoning.

link (url) Project Page [BibTex]

2018

link (url) Project Page [BibTex]


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Discovering Rational Heuristics for Risky Choice

Gul, S., Krueger, P. M., Callaway, F., Griffiths, T. L., Lieder, F.

The 14th biannual conference of the German Society for Cognitive Science, GK, The 14th biannual conference of the German Society for Cognitive Science, GK, September 2018 (conference)

Abstract
How should we think and decide to make the best possible use of our precious time and limited cognitive resources? And how do people’s cognitive strategies compare to this ideal? We study these questions in the domain of multi-alternative risky choice using the methodology of resource-rational analysis. To answer the first question, we leverage a new meta-level reinforcement learning algorithm to derive optimal heuristics for four different risky choice environments. We find that our method rediscovers two fast-and-frugal heuristics that people are known to use, namely Take-The-Best and choosing randomly, as resource-rational strategies for specific environments. Our method also discovered a novel heuristic that combines elements of Take-The-Best and Satisficing. To answer the second question, we use the Mouselab paradigm to measure how people’s decision strategies compare to the predictions of our resource-rational analysis. We found that our resource-rational analysis correctly predicted which strategies people use and under which conditions they use them. While people generally tend to make rational use of their limited resources overall, their strategy choices do not always fully exploit the structure of each decision problem. Overall, people’s decision operations were about 88% as resource-rational as they could possibly be. A formal model comparison confirmed that our resource-rational model explained people’s decision strategies significantly better than the Directed Cognition model of Gabaix et al. (2006). Our study is a proof-of-concept that optimal cognitive strategies can be automatically derived from the principle of resource-rationality. Our results suggest that resource-rational analysis is a promising approach for uncovering people’s cognitive strategies and revisiting the debate about human rationality with a more realistic normative standard.

link (url) Project Page [BibTex]

link (url) Project Page [BibTex]


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Rational metareasoning and the plasticity of cognitive control

Lieder, F., Shenhav, A., Musslick, S., Griffiths, T. L.

PLOS Computational Biology, 14(4):e1006043, Public Library of Science, April 2018 (article)

Abstract
The human brain has the impressive capacity to adapt how it processes information to high-level goals. While it is known that these cognitive control skills are malleable and can be improved through training, the underlying plasticity mechanisms are not well understood. Here, we develop and evaluate a model of how people learn when to exert cognitive control, which controlled process to use, and how much effort to exert. We derive this model from a general theory according to which the function of cognitive control is to select and configure neural pathways so as to make optimal use of finite time and limited computational resources. The central idea of our Learned Value of Control model is that people use reinforcement learning to predict the value of candidate control signals of different types and intensities based on stimulus features. This model correctly predicts the learning and transfer effects underlying the adaptive control-demanding behavior observed in an experiment on visual attention and four experiments on interference control in Stroop and Flanker paradigms. Moreover, our model explained these findings significantly better than an associative learning model and a Win-Stay Lose-Shift model. Our findings elucidate how learning and experience might shape people’s ability and propensity to adaptively control their minds and behavior. We conclude by predicting under which circumstances these learning mechanisms might lead to self-control failure.

Rational metareasoning and the plasticity of cognitive control DOI Project Page Project Page [BibTex]

Rational metareasoning and the plasticity of cognitive control DOI Project Page Project Page [BibTex]

2017


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Enhancing metacognitive reinforcement learning using reward structures and feedback

Krueger, P. M., Lieder, F., Griffiths, T. L.

In Proceedings of the 39th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 2017 (inproceedings)

Project Page Project Page [BibTex]

2017

Project Page Project Page [BibTex]


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Strategy selection as rational metareasoning

Lieder, F., Griffiths, T. L.

Psychological Review, 124, pages: 762-794, American Psychological Association, November 2017 (article)

Abstract
Many contemporary accounts of human reasoning assume that the mind is equipped with multiple heuristics that could be deployed to perform a given task. This raises the question of how the mind determines when to use which heuristic. To answer this question, we developed a rational model of strategy selection, based on the theory of rational metareasoning developed in the artificial intelligence literature. According to our model people learn to efficiently choose the strategy with the best cost–benefit tradeoff by learning a predictive model of each strategy’s performance. We found that our model can provide a unifying explanation for classic findings from domains ranging from decision-making to arithmetic by capturing the variability of people’s strategy choices, their dependence on task and context, and their development over time. Systematic model comparisons supported our theory, and 4 new experiments confirmed its distinctive predictions. Our findings suggest that people gradually learn to make increasingly more rational use of fallible heuristics. This perspective reconciles the 2 poles of the debate about human rationality by integrating heuristics and biases with learning and rationality. (APA PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)

DOI Project Page [BibTex]

DOI Project Page [BibTex]


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An automatic method for discovering rational heuristics for risky choice

Lieder, F., Krueger, P. M., Griffiths, T. L.

In Proceedings of the 39th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society, 2017, Falk Lieder and Paul M. Krueger contributed equally to this publication. (inproceedings)

Abstract
What is the optimal way to make a decision given that your time is limited and your cognitive resources are bounded? To answer this question, we formalized the bounded optimal decision process as the solution to a meta-level Markov decision process whose actions are costly computations. We approximated the optimal solution and evaluated its predictions against human choice behavior in the Mouselab paradigm, which is widely used to study decision strategies. Our computational method rediscovered well-known heuristic strategies and the conditions under which they are used, as well as novel heuristics. A Mouselab experiment confirmed our model’s main predictions. These findings are a proof-of-concept that optimal cognitive strategies can be automatically derived as the rational use of finite time and bounded cognitive resources.

Project Page [BibTex]

Project Page [BibTex]


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Toward a rational and mechanistic account of mental effort

Shenhav, A., Musslick, S., Lieder, F., Kool, W., Griffiths, T., Cohen, J., Botvinick, M.

Annual Review of Neuroscience, 40, pages: 99-124, Annual Reviews, 2017 (article)

Project Page [BibTex]

Project Page [BibTex]

2015


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When to use which heuristic: A rational solution to the strategy selection problem

Lieder, F., Griffiths, T. L.

In Proceedings of the 37th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 2015 (inproceedings)

Abstract
The human mind appears to be equipped with a toolbox full of cognitive strategies, but how do people decide when to use which strategy? We leverage rational metareasoning to derive a rational solution to this problem and apply it to decision making under uncertainty. The resulting theory reconciles the two poles of the debate about human rationality by proposing that people gradually learn to make rational use of fallible heuristics. We evaluate this theory against empirical data and existing accounts of strategy selection (i.e. SSL and RELACS). Our results suggest that while SSL and RELACS can explain people's ability to adapt to homogeneous environments in which all decision problems are of the same type, rational metareasoning can additionally explain people's ability to adapt to heterogeneous environments and flexibly switch strategies from one decision to the next.

link (url) Project Page [BibTex]

2015

link (url) Project Page [BibTex]


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Model-Based Strategy Selection Learning

Lieder, F., Griffiths, T. L.

The 2nd Multidisciplinary Conference on Reinforcement Learning and Decision Making, 2015 (article)

Abstract
Humans possess a repertoire of decision strategies. This raises the question how we decide how to decide. Behavioral experiments suggest that the answer includes metacognitive reinforcement learning: rewards reinforce not only our behavior but also the cognitive processes that lead to it. Previous theories of strategy selection, namely SSL and RELACS, assumed that model-free reinforcement learning identifies the cognitive strategy that works best on average across all problems in the environment. Here we explore the alternative: model-based reinforcement learning about how the differential effectiveness of cognitive strategies depends on the features of individual problems. Our theory posits that people learn a predictive model of each strategy’s accuracy and execution time and choose strategies according to their predicted speed-accuracy tradeoff for the problem to be solved. We evaluate our theory against previous accounts by fitting published data on multi-attribute decision making, conducting a novel experiment, and demonstrating that our theory can account for people’s adaptive flexibility in risky choice. We find that while SSL and RELACS are sufficient to explain people’s ability to adapt to a homogeneous environment in which all decision problems are of the same type, model-based strategy selection learning can also explain people’s ability to adapt to heterogeneous environments and flexibly switch to a different decision-strategy when the situation changes.

link (url) Project Page [BibTex]

link (url) Project Page [BibTex]

2014


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Algorithm selection by rational metareasoning as a model of human strategy selection

Lieder, F., Plunkett, D., Hamrick, J. B., Russell, S. J., Hay, N. J., Griffiths, T. L.

In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 27, 2014 (inproceedings)

Abstract
Selecting the right algorithm is an important problem in computer science, because the algorithm often has to exploit the structure of the input to be efficient. The human mind faces the same challenge. Therefore, solutions to the algorithm selection problem can inspire models of human strategy selection and vice versa. Here, we view the algorithm selection problem as a special case of metareasoning and derive a solution that outperforms existing methods in sorting algorithm selection. We apply our theory to model how people choose between cognitive strategies and test its prediction in a behavioral experiment. We find that people quickly learn to adaptively choose between cognitive strategies. People's choices in our experiment are consistent with our model but inconsistent with previous theories of human strategy selection. Rational metareasoning appears to be a promising framework for reverse-engineering how people choose among cognitive strategies and translating the results into better solutions to the algorithm selection problem.

Project Page [BibTex]

2014

Project Page [BibTex]