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2014


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Algorithm selection by rational metareasoning as a model of human strategy selection

Lieder, F., Plunkett, D., Hamrick, J. B., Russell, S. J., Hay, N. J., Griffiths, T. L.

In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 27, 2014 (inproceedings)

Abstract
Selecting the right algorithm is an important problem in computer science, because the algorithm often has to exploit the structure of the input to be efficient. The human mind faces the same challenge. Therefore, solutions to the algorithm selection problem can inspire models of human strategy selection and vice versa. Here, we view the algorithm selection problem as a special case of metareasoning and derive a solution that outperforms existing methods in sorting algorithm selection. We apply our theory to model how people choose between cognitive strategies and test its prediction in a behavioral experiment. We find that people quickly learn to adaptively choose between cognitive strategies. People's choices in our experiment are consistent with our model but inconsistent with previous theories of human strategy selection. Rational metareasoning appears to be a promising framework for reverse-engineering how people choose among cognitive strategies and translating the results into better solutions to the algorithm selection problem.

Project Page [BibTex]

2014

Project Page [BibTex]


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The high availability of extreme events serves resource-rational decision-making

Lieder, F., Hsu, M., Griffiths, T. L.

In Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 2014 (inproceedings)

[BibTex]

[BibTex]


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Layers of Abstraction: (Neuro)computational models of learning local and global statistical regularities

Diaconescu, A., Lieder, F., Mathys, C., Stephan, K. E.

In 20th Annual Meeting of the Organization for Human Brain Mapping, 2014 (inproceedings)

[BibTex]

[BibTex]

2013


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Controllability and Resource-Rational Planning

Lieder, F., Goodman, N. D., Huys, Q. J.

In Computational and Systems Neuroscience (Cosyne), pages: 112, 2013 (inproceedings)

Abstract
Learned helplessness experiments involving controllable vs. uncontrollable stressors have shown that the perceived ability to control events has profound consequences for decision making. Normative models of decision making, however, do not naturally incorporate knowledge about controllability, and previous approaches to incorporating it have led to solutions with biologically implausible computational demands [1,2]. Intuitively, controllability bounds the differential rewards for choosing one strategy over another, and therefore believing that the environment is uncontrollable should reduce one’s willingness to invest time and effort into choosing between options. Here, we offer a normative, resource-rational account of the role of controllability in trading mental effort for expected gain. In this view, the brain not only faces the task of solving Markov decision problems (MDPs), but it also has to optimally allocate its finite computational resources to solve them efficiently. This joint problem can itself be cast as a MDP [3], and its optimal solution respects computational constraints by design. We start with an analytic characterisation of the influence of controllability on the use of computational resources. We then replicate previous results on the effects of controllability on the differential value of exploration vs. exploitation, showing that these are also seen in a cognitively plausible regime of computational complexity. Third, we find that controllability makes computation valuable, so that it is worth investing more mental effort the higher the subjective controllability. Fourth, we show that in this model the perceived lack of control (helplessness) replicates empirical findings [4] whereby patients with major depressive disorder are less likely to repeat a choice that led to a reward, or to avoid a choice that led to a loss. Finally, the model makes empirically testable predictions about the relationship between reaction time and helplessness.

[BibTex]

2013

[BibTex]


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Learned helplessness and generalization

Lieder, F., Goodman, N. D., Huys, Q. J. M.

In 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 2013 (inproceedings)

[BibTex]

[BibTex]


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Reverse-Engineering Resource-Efficient Algorithms

Lieder, F., Goodman, N. D., Griffiths, T. L.

In NIPS Workshop Resource-Efficient Machine Learning, 2013 (inproceedings)

[BibTex]

[BibTex]


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Modelling trial-by-trial changes in the mismatch negativity

Lieder, F., Daunizeau, J., Garrido, M. I., Friston, K. J., Stephan, K. E.

{PLoS} {C}omputational {B}iology, 9(2):e1002911, Public Library of Science, 2013 (article)

[BibTex]

[BibTex]


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A neurocomputational model of the mismatch negativity

Lieder, F., Stephan, K. E., Daunizeau, J., Garrido, M. I., Friston, K. J.

{PLoS Computational Biology}, 9(11):e1003288, Public Library of Science, 2013 (article)

[BibTex]

[BibTex]

2012


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Burn-in, bias, and the rationality of anchoring

Lieder, F., Griffiths, T. L., Goodman, N. D.

Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 25, pages: 2699-2707, 2012 (article)

Abstract
Bayesian inference provides a unifying framework for addressing problems in machine learning, artificial intelligence, and robotics, as well as the problems facing the human mind. Unfortunately, exact Bayesian inference is intractable in all but the simplest models. Therefore minds and machines have to approximate Bayesian inference. Approximate inference algorithms can achieve a wide range of time-accuracy tradeoffs, but what is the optimal tradeoff? We investigate time-accuracy tradeoffs using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm as a metaphor for the mind's inference algorithm(s). We find that reasonably accurate decisions are possible long before the Markov chain has converged to the posterior distribution, i.e. during the period known as burn-in. Therefore the strategy that is optimal subject to the mind's bounded processing speed and opportunity costs may perform so few iterations that the resulting samples are biased towards the initial value. The resulting cognitive process model provides a rational basis for the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic. The model's quantitative predictions are tested against published data on anchoring in numerical estimation tasks. Our theoretical and empirical results suggest that the anchoring bias is consistent with approximate Bayesian inference.

link (url) [BibTex]

2012

link (url) [BibTex]

2006


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Die Effektivität von schriftlichen und graphischen Warnhinweisen auf Zigarettenschachteln

Petersen, L., Lieder, F.

Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie, 37(4):245-258, Verlag Hans Huber, 2006 (article)

Abstract
In der vorliegenden Studie wurde die Effektivität von furchterregenden Warnhinweisen bei jugendlichen Rauchern und Raucherinnen analysiert. 336 Raucher/-innen (Durchschnittsalter: 15 Jahre) wurden schriftliche oder graphische Warnhinweise auf Zigarettenpackungen präsentiert (Experimentalbedingungen; n = 96, n = 119), oder sie erhielten keine Warnhinweise (Kontrollbedingung; n = 94). Anschließend wurden die Modellfaktoren des revidierten Modells der Schutzmotivation (Arthur & Quester, 2004) erhoben. Die Ergebnisse stützen die Hypothese, dass die Faktoren «Schweregrad der Schädigung» und «Wahrscheinlichkeit der Schädigung» die Verhaltenswahrscheinlichkeit, weniger oder leichtere Zigaretten zu rauchen, vermittelt über den Mediator «Furcht» beeinflussen. Die Verhaltenswahrscheinlichkeit wurde dagegen nicht von den drei experimentellen Bedingungen beeinflusst. Auch konnten die Faktoren «Handlungswirksamkeitserwartungen» und «Selbstwirksamkeitserwartungen» nicht als Moderatoren des Zusammenhangs zwischen Furcht und Verhaltenswahrscheinlichkeit bestätigt werden.

DOI [BibTex]

2006

DOI [BibTex]